Introduction
PETS ARE EVERYWHERE. In our homes there are millions of pet dogs, cats, gerbils, birds, fish, rabbits, snakes, and monkeys. Our political economy includes a multibillion-dollar service industry that provides veterinary medical care, food, breeding, and assorted paraphernalia.' Why do we have such an institution? Pet owners and pet lovers join the pet industry in detailing benefits that pet ownership confers on individual pet owners. Pets, they say, provide pleasure, companionship, and protection, or the feeling of being secure.2 Pet owning decreases blood pressure and increases life expectancy for coronary and other patients.3 Pets provide an excuse for exercise and a stimulus to meet people.4 They help children to learn gentleness and responsibility; they help young couples to prepare for parenthood; and they give their owners some of the pleasure of having children without some of the responsibility. Pets help people to deal with the loss by death of a friend or relative.5
Not least of all, pets are useful in many kinds of psychotherapy and family therapy.6
What is it about pets that makes them useful and attractive to human beings in these ways? In this essay I will explore one possible answer to this question. I will suggest that pethood derives its powerful and, at first blush, wholly beneficial aspect from its ability to allow pet owners to experience a relationship ever present in political ideology: the relationship between the distinction of which beings are our familial kin from which are not kin and the distinction of which beings are our species kind from which are not our kind. Pethood allows us as individuals to experience and enjoy that ideologically crucial distinction in a way that is at once comforting and apparently harmless. And, indeed, we generally think of pethood as an innocuous and even trivial institution of "consumer society.?7 We will see here, however, that the particular idealized articulation of kinship with kind that the traditional institution of pethood helps to perpetuate conceals even from would-be kindly human beings a brutally inhumane political reality.
concerned not so much with the neat expression of an individual pet owner by his individual pet as with the general expression of Western familial and national structure in its unique institution of pethood. It is a generally accepted doctrine nowadays that "the human/pet relationship, while biologically derived and universal, may also serve a particularized psychopathologic purpose'; 1 I want to discuss here the sexual, familial, and finally social role that the institution of pethood plays in contemporary politics and ideology.
The Kind and Kin of Pets
A little less than kin and more than kind.
-Shakespeare, Hamlet"
The Oxford English Dictionary defines pet as "any animal domesticated or tamed kept as a favorite or treated with indulgence." 12 This is a reasonable preliminary definition of pet. And since it passes over, even obscures, certain potentially discomforting ramifications of what it may mean to domesticate animals and to indulge them, it is also a socially useful definition. My purpose here is to consider a few potentially disconcerting aspects of the role of pets in our society and to examine anew their sexual, familial, and political function. I shall focus first on the way in which the pet lover generally thinks of the species and the family of his pet.
The kind, or species. The ordinary definition of the family pet as an animal tends to obscure the essential demarcation between human beings and other animals since it implies that any animal, including a human being, can be a pet.
To put the matter this way is, however, to assume that there is an essential interspecies demarcation between human and animal beings, which pet lovers might deny. Pet lovers, after all, "find it difficult to separate people and animals," as Betty White confesses in her book Pet-Love;'3 they would have it that we humans can sometimes have a special, or super-special, kinship with the particular living being who is a pet of ours. 14 In America today our thinking of pets as human and our treating them as human has many aspects. We feed our pets human food, for example, and celebrate their birthdays. 15 More than half of American pet owners look upon their pets as "almost human"; nine tenths talk to their pets as though they were human,"'6 and six hundred pet cemeteries in the United States imitate the burial or cremation service for human beings or bury animals alongside their human owners. 17 For pet lovers, this interspecies transformation of the particular animal into man, 8 and in the Homeric tale of Circe, where men are metamorphosed into domestic animals.) '9 It is also the rule expressed in the typical English pet lover's practice of giving his animal a human name, a practice that suggests that the pet lover regards his pet as though it were human. Indeed, to pet means "to treat a human being as an animal."20
The tendency to erase-and, if you want, also to rise above-the ordinary distinction between human and animal beings suggests the first potentially disturbing question raised not only by the ordinary definition of pet but also by the institution of pethood itself. "What kind of animal is a pet?" or "As what kind of animal is a pet thought of?" Another way to put the same question is, "What is a The "cade lamb," which is the archetypal pet in the Scottish and English traditions, is a being raised by hand in the family; it is a being in the household as well as the house. 22 For many pet lovers, their animals are thus not only surrogate family members that function as children, grandchildren, spouses, or parents,23 or that are considered to be as important as family members.24 For pet lovers, pets are family.
But how can an animal be in my family, or be thought of as being in my family?
What is my pet's kinship relation to me, or its kind of kinship relation to me? Bestiality andlor incest. Somehow the family pet is, or is thought of, as being familiar enough to be both in the special family, or in humankind, and in the particular consanguineous family.25 If my pet animal is somehow human, or is thought of as being somehow human, and if my pet is also somehow in the family, or is thought of as being in the family, then might I not wonder whether I can love or marry my humanoid pet without somehow violating a basic taboo, or somehow thinking of violating one?
For all its outlandishness, the preceding question suggests how, at some level, pet love traduces (or transcends) two practices we ordinarily think of as being taboo. One of these practices is bestiality, or interspecies lovemaking, which is an effect of traducing the ordinary interspecies distinctions between human and nonhuman beings, or between kind and non-kind. The other practice is incest, or intrafamilial lovemaking, which is an effect of traducing the ordinary distinc-being from outside humankind) or incestuous attraction (between a human being and a being from inside the particular kinship family). Or, as I am suggesting, whether we look at it from the viewpoint of the individual or of society, the institution of pethood allows us to toe the line between chaste attraction and both bestiality and incest taken together.
In psychoanalytic and anthropological terms: ontogenetically the pet is a transitional object,27 and phylogenetically it is a totem.28
Puppy love and petting. Connections between kind, kin, and sexuality of the sort we are describing are hinted at throughout ordinary language. Consider, for example, the popular American terms puppy love and petting. On account of their humorous aspect these symptomatic terms are able, each in its own way, both to conceal and to reveal the bestial and incestuous aspect of pethood. 1) Puppy love. One ideological tendency of the institution of pethood is to make such distinctions as that between sexual and nonsexual feelings seem clear and uncontroversial. Thus pet lovers may object to my wanting to discuss the sexual significance of loving pets in that, although pethood may blur the distinction between kind and non-kind (hence the definition of animal love) and also the distinction between kin and non-kin (hence the definition of kin love), yet it does not blur the distinction between sexual and nonsexual love (hence the definition of bestiality and incest). This objection assumes that there is such a thing as essentially nonsexual love for a being who both is and is not both kind and kin. Yet even ordinary language belies the assumption of essential difference between such sorts of love. Consider first the term puppy love.
Puppy love between human beings, we say ordinarily, is, like calf love, a sentimental and transitory affection between a young boy and girl;29 we say it is, for all practical purposes, asexual. (It is the presumably asexual aspect of puppy love that helps to explain why puppy love is usually a term of mild contempt.)30
Puppy love is supposed to be as sexually innocuous as loving a "puppy" in the traditional sense of "a small dog used as a lady's pet or plaything, a toy dog;"3' the beloved being in puppy love is much like a poupee, or doll (poupee, the French term for "doll," is the etymological source of puppy), and also much like a puppet (a term cognate with puppy).32
We assume that puppy love is, or should be, just as sexually innocuous as loving a close human kin is, or should be. Put otherwise, we assume that it is no more or less bestial for a human being to love a puppy dog-a being from outside his species-than it is incestuous for a human being to love a human "puppy lover" from inside his consanguineous family.33 It follows that, if one wishes to avoid or sublimate both literal bestiality and literal incest-as who does not?-one way to do so would be to seek out a "snugglepup."
The term snugglepup indicates a pet puppy with whom one snuggles, in the sense that a child snuggles with its transitional object or that the one half of all the pets in the United States who sleep in the same bed with a member of the family snuggle or are snuggled by their owners.34 Snugglepup also indicates a young man with whom one attends petting parties.35 (Sometimes we call such a man a pet.) Or, as I am suggesting, snugglepup may indicate both the beloved animal and the human lover taken together.
The idea of snugglepuppy love, or pet love, is a great commercial success in the contemporary period. It is sold, in its feminine form, as the Penthouse "Pet of the Month" and as the Playboy "Bunny."36 (Playboy's humanoid Bunny is a dolllike creature if ever there were one, as unlike a rabbit as a poupee is unlike a dog.)
Snugglepup love is the commercial ideal of relationship between living beings: for all its apparent sexuality, it is a relationship that is infertile and unthreatening.
In the social and sexual institutions represented for us by the Pet and the Bunny, we grown-up human beings dress other human beings to look like animals (or we brand them with the insignia of an animal),37 as though these particular human beings were animals.
2) Petting. We may "doubt if there's [really] such a thing as puppy love,"38 i.e., love between young human beings that is sexually innocuous. Freudians, after all, doubt whether there is such a thing as asexual love-or even essentially nonincestuous affection-in a human kinship family. Put another way, we may wonder at the simultaneously asexual and sexual significance of petting pets. Consider here the term petting.
Petting means not only mere patting, "fondling or hugging,"39 but also "sexual embracing" or "petting below the waist."40 Therefore, our petting an animal that we say we love-a being whose kind we distinguish in a commonsense way from our own kind-is, by the definition of petting as "sexual embracing," a kind of bestiality. (It is like being lapped by a lapdog.)41 Our "petting" the child, sibling, or parent whom we say that we love-a being whose kinship we identify in a commonsense way with our own kinship-is, by the same definition of petting as "sexual embracing," incest.42 (We nickname "Pet"-and sometimes also "Beast"-the human beings with whom we are intimate.) And, by the same definition, our "petting" the family pet-a being who is at once neither our kind nor our kin and also both our kind and our kin-is both bestiality and incest taken together.
Some students of the various physiological benefits to pet owners of hugging and patting their pets assume, as we might expect, a distinction between "engaged" and "idle" petting. According to them, "idle" petting resembles "the absent-minded fondling of a child while attention is focused elsewhere"; idle petting "can provide reverie and relaxation." 43 We may now hypothesize one explanation why it is absent-minded fondling or petting of a pet as though it were a child that produces relaxation: such petting allows us to mark and transcend an otherwise absolute and oppressive distinction between kin and non-kin and between kind and nonThe Family Pet 125 kind while at the same time allowing us briefly to blur without shame the distinction between sexual and nonsexual demonstration of affection.
From this perspective on the kind and kin of pets, the way to determine rightly the familial and sexual role of pets must go beyond anthropocentric analysis of psychotic or neurotic human-animal relationships, analyses of the kind that we encounter in such studies as Sigmund Freud's "Little Hans" and "Wolf Man," Helen Deutsch's "Chicken Phobia," and Sandor Ferenczi's "Little Chanticleer. "44 These psychoanalytic studies ignore the institution of pethood except to make it a latter-day totemism. Freud, in Totem and Taboo, argues that in zoophobia, or fear of animals, the animal serves to preserve the barrier against incest; 45 I should argue that it is in zoophilia/zooerasty, or animal love-i.e., in particularized pethood, especially nowadays and in America-that the attempt to avoid incest is more typically made.
The Idea of Universal Kinship
The institution of particular pethood depends upon the individual pet owner having a different relationship to his animal than he has to other animals, or on his distinguishing between his particular family pet and unfamiliar animals in general. This dependence means that pethood generally militates against the idea of general interspecies kinship and may even exclude it.46 In pethood only family pets are familial kin; only they are human kind.
However, pet love is, in some circumstances, extendable to a brotherly (or, if you will, sisterly) love of all animals universally-to a kinship with all life.47 Pet love seems to be extendable to universal interspecies love in, for example, the case of the pet love of Chaucer's Prioress, who weeps not only when someone beats her familiar dog but also when an apparently unfamiliar mouse is caught in a trap.48 Pet love also seems extendable to universal interspecies love in the case of the pet love of Christopher Smart, a lover of his own cat who writes that animals and birds are, together with himself, "fellow subjects of the eternal King."49 One consequence of hypothesizing a universal kinship among specifically human beings is that such kinship makes any act of sexual intercourse between human beings incestuous.50 That is one reason why religious celibates such as Maybe such a quest for the Beast-or such a flight from incest-is not as bad as it sounds. Is not bestiality better than incest? Or "spiritual bestiality" better than "spiritual incest"? The social anthropologists call the taboo on incest, not that on bestiality, the "Law of laws." In "Beauty and the Beast," the heroine leaves her loving kinsman and kisses the Beast.
Excursus on the story of Beauty and the Beast. "Beauty and the Beast" is the beloved and celebrated story of a young maiden, Beauty, whose agreement to marry a fearsome animal, Beast, corresponds to that animal's transformation into a handsome man. Some interpreters of this fairy tale explain away its sexual and bestial aspects by saying that it is a philosophical allegory of the rational soul's journey toward intellectual, or spiritual, love. According to this interpretation, the sensitive Beauty's insight into the spiritual beauty inside the physically animal, hence ugly, Beast precipitates the Beast's physical transformation into a human, hence beautiful, being.53 This reading of the story is reassuring and enlightening, but it does not take into account that, in the story, it is Beauty's kissing the Beastand in some versions of the story her sexual intercourse with the Beast-not her rare insight into him, that is the agent of the Beast's transformation from animal to man. This sexual aspect of "Beauty and the Beast" has made it an attractive text for psychoanalytic criticism, which generally interprets the fairy tale as expressing Beauty's fear of human sexuality and her eventual accommodation to human sexuality at the same time that it explains away its bestial aspect. Thus some analysts say that the story figures a young girl's reaction to a man who requests that she have sex with him, a request that she can understand at first only as a beastly one but that she finally comes to understand as only human.54 According to one psychoanalytic elaboration of the tale, the man with animal, or sexual, desires for whom the Beast stands is Beauty's own father; one critic argues that her father's picking the red rose in Beast's garden is a symbol of his desire, conscious or unconscious, to "deflower" Beauty.55 The psychoanalytic readings of the story thus claim generally that Beast is any man with sexual desires or that Beast is Beauty's father with sexual desires. Such readings are adequate to the The Family Pet 127 tale only so long as we grant that Beast is not, at some level, really a beast, or animal. A literal reading of the story in any one of its hundreds of versions shows, however, that Beast is, in the first instance, not a man with ugly animal/sexual desires (which is how the psychoanalysts would have it) but an animal/beast. "Beauty and the Beast" is, in fact, the most widespread of the "Animal Groom Stories"-a type of folk tale in which the hero or heroine marries an animal. In the "Animal Groom Story" the hero or heroine does not marry an ugly man with a beautiful soul, as the proponents of the view that "Beauty and the Beast" is simply an allegorical expression of the rational soul's journey toward intellectual beauty would have it, nor a man with apparently sexual/ugly desires (as the proponents of the psychoanalytic view would have it), but an animal. "Beauty and the Beast" is ultimately about bestiality and the human family.56
Who else is there for Beauty to marry but an animal? All the male human beings in Beauty's world are her close kin-usually her father and three brothers.57 (For her as for some Christians, all men are her kin.) All her men are family, so that, for Beauty, any act of intraspecies sexual intercourse is incestuous.
For Beauty, only an act of interspecies sexual intercourse, or of bestiality, can be nonincestuous: only bestiality is chaste.
Consider, as a useful scheme for understanding the metaphorical structures-or species and familial divisions-of the fairy tale, the two interrelated "laws" that Edward Westermarck proposes in his The History of Human Marriage.
First, Westermarck's species "law of similarity" has it that we animals, both human and nonhuman, tend to mate with those like ourselves; we shy away from sexual intercourse with those outside our species, or from bestiality. Second, Westermarck's family "law of dissimilarity" has it that we tend to mate with those unlike ourselves; we shy away from sexual intercourse inside the family, or from incest.58
In the fairy tale, Beauty shies away from sexual intercourse/marriage with the animal that she loves because that animal is so much unlike her as to be outside her species, and she shies away from exclusive love with her father because he is so much like her as to be inside her immediate family. Throughout the middle section of the fairy tale, Beauty vacillates between living with her loving father and living with her beastly lover; she wavers between incest and bestiality.
Yet Beast, who is the extraspecies animal in Beauty's life, is, to all intents, the same as her father, who is the intrafamilial man-and, essentially, the only manin Beauty's life. This identity between the two male beings in Beauty's life-the one too unlike her, the other too like her-is hinted at in the economic bargain that informs the tale: the deal whereby Beauty's life is traded to Beast in exchange for, or in behalf of, the life of her father. And the identity between Beast and Father is also hinted at in the two rival "suitors"' mortal sicknesses, which compel Beauty to choose between attending to the needs of one or to those of the other, hence to choose between killing one or the other.
In "Beauty and the Beast" father and Beast-or human exogamy and bestial However, the success of Beauty's search for a wholly acceptable being with whom to mate-an intraspecies and extrafamilial one-depends on our granting that there is a real difference of kind between human beings and animal beings.
For the difference between incest and bestiality, upon which Beauty's search for the right beast (call him Husband)-and hence also for a chaste marriagedepends, vanishes if we hypothesize not only that all human beings are our kin (the traditional Christian view) but also that all animals are our kind (the view of Saint Francis and some pet lovers). The consequence of this view that all animals are our kind is that the only alternative to absolute celibacy is bestial incest, or incestuous bestiality.
In the same way, the hypothesis of our kinship with animals leads either to vegetarianism or cannibalism, and even the comforting difference between vegetarianism and cannibalism vanishes if we hypothesize a human kinship with vegetables as well as with animals. The consequence of this view is that the only alternative to starvation is cannibalism.
To choose between celibacy and bestiality/incest and also between starvation
The Family Pet 129 and cannibalism is difficult and needful, yet society has imposed its sentence upon us: eat, drink, and be married. For fully socialized human beings-i.e., for civilized adults-the primordially tragic need to choose between such dire alternatives must appear comedic.
Kindness and Christendom
Let us backtrack and reconsider, on the one hand, the relationship of the idea of universal animal kinship to the idea of universal human kinship and, on the other hand, the connection of the idea of universal animal kinship with the purported moral obligation to be kind to kin, or to be our brother's keeper. group not only from our kinship but, insofar as we believe that all our kind are our kin, also from our kind.
Particularist religion rules out of order this politically dangerous slide from saying that all humankind are our kin to saying that only brethren are humans and all nonbrethren are only animals. It avoids this pitfall by holding that there is more than one brotherhood, or tribe, of human beings. For particularists there are human brothers and also others who are not, on account of their otherness, less than humankind.
While the universalist view insists that all aliens are animals (it cannot admit the existence of others who are human), the particularist view allows us to think of and treat some beings from outside one's particular tribe as humans rather than as animals.
Universalist religion thinks of and treats differently than does particularist religion what it thinks of as extratribal beings, i.e., beings from outside the essential kinship group. For universalists all extratribal beings are ipso facto also extrafamilial and extraspecies beings, i.e., animals. From "our" viewpoint, of course, the beings that universalists call extraspecies beings may be either animal beings or human beings; we would call them human beings, for example, if we and the beings in question were members of another universalist sect or if we were particularists for whom some extratribal beings are human. Now insofar as the universalists' figuring of universal kinship extends kinship in the essential tribe or family to include not only those beings whom it considers to be human but also those beings whom it considers to be animal-an extension that its theorists sometimes make in order to eliminate the otherwise inevitable In what follows I shall adopt this possibly inaccurate Christian representation of Christianity and of Judaism as a means to tease out certain practical moral and political implications of universalist and particularist ideologies.67 I shall discuss the largely "secular" and "nationalist" states of Christendom-such states as France and England; their thinking about and treatment of "others" is connected with the primitive ideology that Christianity tends to embrace, whether in official Pauline or unofficial Napoleonic and later guises. For both the "religious" and the "secular" Christian there are, in regard to animals and kinship, two positions in polar opposition to each other. 1) Animals are akin to humans; that is, animals are our brothers, hence are to be thought of and treated as if they were members of our species/tribe. In this view we are not the "keepers" of animals but their equals. In holding this view Christianity is what one historian of animal sentimentality calls "the most anthropocentric religion that the world has ever seen.?68 2) Animals are extraspecies and extratribal beings, and hence, like all essentially nonhuman things, animals are outside the "covenant."
The position that all living creatures are our brethren is an hypothesis entertained by such Christian thinkers as St. Francis, who preached his doctrine to the birds, and St. Anthony, whose horse, it is said, used to kneel to receive the eucharistic host.69 And the universal kinship of all living creatures is a popular notion in secular Christian culture. Thus, one widespread old English Christmas carol-a song celebrating the birth of an extraspecies god as an intraspecies human being-includes the following refrain:
The friendly beasts around him stood:
"Jesus, our brother, kind and good. "70 In performing this carol, the members of a chorus of human beings, a species that we define as "speaking animals," pretend to be members of a choir of "domestic animals that speak" (goats, chickens, sheep, and so on)-as if the caroling humans were animals or the animals were caroling humans. The notion of the animals' friendship, kindliness, and brotherliness to man is pleasant, of course.
But it can also be unsettling. For example, universal kinship turns all meat eating into cannibalism-even into incestuous cannibalism, since the flesh that a meat eater devours must come from the body of a "brother," that is, from the body of a butchered member of one's essentially human family, or, if you prefer, from a member of one's super-species family. At the very least such kinship as this "Carol of the Beasts" supposes turns all meat eating into cannibalism for him, or for Him, whom the animals call their "kind ... brother."
The significance for Christian thought of the analogy between Jesus and the domestic animal-Jesus is part man and part God and the domestic animal is part man and part animal-is hinted by the birthplace that Christians generally assign to Jesus: a stable.7' There being no proper place among human beings for this extraordinary creature to be born-"no crib for a bed"-Mary gave birth to Jesus "away in a manger."72 Many Christian pet lovers, following or imitating Jesus, wish that they too had been born among animals: "I often think that I should have been happier," writes Barbara Woodhouse, "born in a stable than at
The view of all God's creatures not only having a place in the choir but also inhabiting the same species place in the choir is totalitarian. And since it denies the various animals a place of their own, it often leads to the relegation of animals not to "human beings" but to mere "things," say things to eat. (Instead of saying, "All the animals are our kin," we come to say, "Only my kin are animals, the being that I eat is only a thing.") Indeed, the second Christian view of animals has it that, insofar as animals are not, like family pets, inside of our family-or insofar as they are, unlike family pets, entirely outside of our species-animals are, like vegetables and stones, outside the covenant of the law. Christianity, especially in its postmedieval context, thus grants to man virtually limitless dominion over the world of "things," say animals, in which human beings live.74
Taken together, these two interconnected views of animals: 1) that animals are akin to humans and therefore part of the covenant and 2) that animals are not akin to humans and therefore not part of the covenant, might be contrasted with the view of animals that informs such a "particularist" religion as Judaism.
Judaism allows that there are extraspecies members of the covenant (i.e., non- Returning to Eden is their aptly entitled handbook.89
The pet as inedible animal. In Judaism the rules of how to be kind to animals are inextricably connected with the rules of how to be cruel. The God of the Pentateuch tells us not only how to tend the animals but which to butcher and how to butcher them. The closeness of the relation in Judaism between being kind to animals and eating them ought not to be underestimated.90 One is cruel in such a way as, or in order, to be able to be kind. 9' In this context it is important to emphasize that Christianity, unlike many other religions, does not ban the eating of any food: Christianity is essentially an omnivorous ideology.92 Indeed, even cannibalism, which is banned absolutely in most other cultures, is sometimes enjoined in Christianity. In the Eucharist, for example, the celebrant eats or says that he eats-in however extraordinary a sense-a being that is not only partly nonhuman, or divine, but also partly human.
In an essentially omnivorous Christian culture the widespread institutionalization of sanctioned pethood in the modern era made a crucial difference to the view of animals and men alike. Christianity had been an omnivorous religion, but in the new order the pet emerged as the one essentially inedible animal.
Indeed, one definition of pet that tells us about the way that we "indulge" these domestic animals is that they are "the animal or nonhuman beings that cannot, or should not, be eaten." (It is a definition that, in the Christian context and in the gourmet centers of America and England, where almost all kinds of flesh are sold, may go as far as necessary to specify the kind of "indulgence"-as the Oxford English Dictionary calls it-that distinguishes pets from the other animals.)
In Christianity, the advent of pethood, or of the institution that made human kind and familial kin out of beings that had theretofore been considered extraspecies and extrafamilial, brought with it the feeling, amply illustrated in the literature, that it would be like ordinary cannibalism to eat a pet.93
That there should be anything at all that it would be wrong to eat was a crucial new position for Christendom. (It is a Protestant position; Roman Catholic churchmen frowned upon pet owning94-and also upon the practice of giving to animals "Christian" names, or names "appropriate" to human beings95 -because such practices tended to confuse the partly human Christ with the partly human Fido, or the Eucharist with pet eating.) And for many decades after the introduction of widespread pethood, the romantic and Victorian Christians treated as identical pet eating and cannibalism; they conflated the new taboo, "Thou shalt not eat a pet"-a taboo that the institution of pethood promulgated-with the old taboo, "Thou shalt not eat a human being"-a taboo that the institution of traditional Christianity had both promulgated (insofar as the human being on the platter is most anyone) and also broken or transcended (insofar as the human Eating and sexual intercourse. The anthropologist Edmund Leach, adapting a canonical anthropological thesis that "there is a universal tendency [among human beings] to make ritual and verbal associations between eating and sexual intercourse," argues that "it is a plausible hypothesis that the way in which animals are categorized with regard to edibility will have some correspondence to the way in which human beings are categorized with regard to sexual intercourse.&97 Leach then goes on to find a structural parallel, in the tradition of Levi-Strauss, between two groups: 1) those beings with whom we are barred from having sexual intercourse; and 2) those beings that we are barred from eating. Though he does not say so, Leach makes two or three far-reaching and, at first blush, commonsense assumptions about these two categories of forbidden things. As we shall see, the anthropology of the pet figures centrally in these assumptions, and Leach tends to mistake its complex role in the structuring of taboos on sexual intercourse and eating.
Leach's first noteworthy assumption is that only human beings belong in group 1, i.e., in the group of beings with whom we are barred from having sexual relations. This assumption means that, while he considers the taboo on incest (which distinguishes those human beings with whom we may have sexual intercourse from those with whom we may not), he passes over the taboo on bestiality (which distinguishes those animals, if any, with which we may have sexual relations from those with which we may not). Yet there are people for whom sexual intercourse with certain kinds (or species) of more or less familiar (or kin) animals is not absolutely condemned. 98 Leach's second noteworthy assumption is that only animals belong in group 2, i.e., in the group of beings that can be divided according to which are edible and which are not edible. This assumption means that, while he considers the taboo on eating animals (which distinguishes those animals we may eat from those we may not), he does not consider the taboo on cannibalism (which distinguishes those human beings, if any, we may eat from those we may not). Yet there are people for whom eating certain human beings is not only allowable but even obligatory.99 Ordinary cannibalism, it is said, involves the eating of human flesh;
and Catholic Christianity imposes on celebrants the obligation to eat the flesh and blood of a being that is not only part nonhuman (divine) but also part human.
Finally, the principal examples that Leach uses to illustrate group 1 and group 2 contradict an excellent hypothesis of his own about pets. That hypothesis is that the pet is not so much an animal per se as an intermediating being between an animal being and a human being.'00 Leach contradicts this hypothesis when he says that the quintessential example of a being in group 1, i.e., the group of beings with which we may not have sexual intercourse, is a member of our own human family; however, as we have seen, a pet as family member might serve just as well. Similarly he contradicts this hypothesis when he says that the quintessential example of a being in group 2, i.e., the group of beings whom we may not eat, is a pet; however, as we have seen, a human being might serve just as well. If, as Leach's original hypothesis suggests, the pet is an "animal-man," it belongs as well or ill in group 1 as in group 2; a pet is as much or little a being with whom we cannot have sexual intercourse as it is a being whom we cannot eat.
Insofar as we conceive the pet as both human and nonhuman, it stands at the intersection between species (it is my kind and another kind as well). Similarly, insofar as we conceive the pet as being both familial and nonfamilial it stands at the intersection between families (it is my kin and not my kin). The pet thus stands at the focal chasse-croise', or crossing-over point, of the taboo concerning eating with the taboo concerning incest.
We have seen, then, that Leach goes some distance toward establishing a structural "homology," or series of correspondences, between eating and sexual intercourse in terms of animals and human beings. However, what we have discovered so far in this essay on the family pet is that the problematic involving pethood and the relation between human and animal shows itself not as a reassuring and easily comprehended structural homology between eating and sexual intercourse-which is the canonical anthropological viewpoint that Leach represents-but as an identity of eating with sexual intercourse.
The family pet stands both at the borderline between family and nonfamily (i.e., at the borderline between those beings with whom it would be incest to have sexual intercourse and those with whom it would not be incest) and at the borderline between animal and nonanimal or between man and non-man (i.e., at the borderline between those beings which may be eaten and those which may not). Pets stand at the intersection of kin and kind. If one is not essentially akin to a Christian, one is not humankind; and, as an animal, one has no legal right to be treated kindly; one is exploitable along with vegetables and stones.
The disturbing slide from the extension of kinship to others toward the denial of kindness to others-the slide that we considered in our discussion of kindness and cruelty to animals-occurs not only when we say that we are extending kinship to all extraspecies beings but also when we say, somewhat less grandly, The Family Pet 139
For some people, the reason that we should be kind to such an animal as an ass is that it is protected by the law. For others, the reason might be that a particular ass has been kindly toward us. (An animal's having been good to us is the reason that God in the Old Testament puts into the mouth of Balaam's ass, whom
Balaam would kill with a sword: "Am I not your ass, upon which you have ridden all your life long and to this day? Was I ever accustomed to do so to you?"'"10 But for Coleridge, as for Saint Francis, the reason that a man should be kind to an ass is that an ass is kindred with us in a universal interspecies siblinghood.
In Interspecies equality, for which we say such religious celibates as Saint Francis stood, leads to a "spiritual" kind of bestiality, and intrafamiliar equality, for which Saint Francis also stood, leads to a "spiritual" kind of incest. Pets are especially useful to us here in America, in the age of the small, "nuclear" family, because this age puts unique pressures on the kinship structure of the family. In the past, there were family slaves, nursemaids, servants, mistresses, and domestic working animals who provided safety valves for large extended families, families that perhaps needed such safety valves less than our smaller families do. The general disappearance of such metakinship institutions as domestic servants has left a lacuna that pets often fill." 8
Maybe pets provide a better safety valve than meta-kin of our own kind: one can love a pet more uninhibitedly than one can love a slave, nursemaid, or servant, precisely because in itself the taboo on bestiality (with the pet insofar as it is not a member of the human species) tends to make the taboo on incest (with the pet insofar as it is a member of the family), which we might generally desire, unthinkable. The taboo on bestiality thus makes unnecessary an even more repressive explicit taboo on incest.'19 Fleeing the human for the animal and the sexual for the asexual, one comes upon the family pet with a sigh of relief.
The pet thus represents one solution to the incest taboo. But perhaps it represents more. Animals, after all, are not only sociologically totemic and psychologically transitional objects for human beings; they are also somewhat conscious beings like human beings. They are the same and different. Are animals any less wonderful than extraterrestrial beings like "E.T."? Are the intersubjective barriers to interspecies relationships really greater than the awesome barriers to intraspecies human relationships?
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The dominant ideology of our time dismisses this question by claiming that animals as such do not really exist. An anthropocentric ideology abetted by the Cartesian view that animals are automata, this ideology regards animals as things to be exploited-say as elements of a smoothly running family, old-age home, or farm, or as moral counterparts to human beings (guinea pigs about whom moralists argue whether their lives as "experimental animals" are too painful for human beings to bear). '20 To imagine how animals may be, or may be thought of, as other than mere things would require a leap of the imagination and a feat of historical scholarship beyond the purview of this essay.' 21 Yet it is now clear that we need to reinvestigate several long-standing and influential questions. Did we, for example, look differently upon animals before the advent of an economic system that treats human beings as "living tools?"''22 Did the disappearance of domestic working animals make for a diminution in our emotional life? Do closer relations with edible animals and with slaughterhouses encourage a more extended hierarchy of living creatures? What is the cultural significance of the Enlightenment view that wild animals cannot be owned as property while working animals can be owned as property? How, if at all, do we own our pets?'23
The peculiar institution of pethood generally has the quieting effect of helping to conceal both the sociological urgency of such questions and the articulation of kin with kind that underlies modern nationalist and internationalist ideology.
Pethood is in itself a relatively kindly and unthreatening institution. Yet the ideology of pethood comes to the rescue of proselytist politics by articulating an idealized chasse'-croise' between kin and kind. In this way pethood helps to conceal even from would-be kindly human beings the brutally inhumane reality of the doctrine of universal (human) brotherhood.
Family pets are generally mythological beings on the line between human kind and animal kind, or beings thought of as being on the line between. Yet sometimes we really cannot tell whether a being is essentially human or animalsay when we were children, or when we shall become extraterrestrial explorers.
Sometimes we really cannot tell whether a being is our kind or not our kind, our kin or not our kin; we cannot tell what we are and to whom. If there were no such beings as pets, we would breed them, for ourselves, in the imagination. An eighty-pound dog costs $8353 for its lifetime. , 1983 ), 56. It is worth noting that, although the French language has no single word to indicate the kind of being that we mean by pet-few, if any, languages do-French does bring out the relevant ambiguity of most all pethood in its term animalfamilier, which is the closest translational equivalent in French to the English word pet. Animal familier means "familiar animal" and "family animal." That is, the French term for "pet" indicates an animal that is at once part of the family's kinship structure and also, like an animal domestique, part of its property.
26. Beck and Katcher, Between Pets and People, 73, write that "since the pet has the status of a favored child in the family, sexual exploitation of pets is a kind of incest," and they claim that "zoophilia can be a kind of incest" (77). Yet they seek ultimately to distinguish the one taboo from the other, insisting, for example, that the taboo on bestiality is more "effective" than that on incest and ignoring even the logical connections between species and family boundaries that make both taboos mutually inextricable parts of a single ideological or political whole. 31. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "puppy," italics mine. According to the dictionary, toy dogs are small dogs "of little value or importance"; Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "toy,"
value being used here in the sense in which we say that nonworking animals lack "value." The breeding of toy dogs marks a new beginning in the history of the interspecies relationship between man and dog.
32. For puppylpoupee and puppy/puppet, see Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "puppy." 33. In these terms, an accurate counterpart to puppy lover, which suggests a relationship that is at once bestial and not bestial, is kissin' cousin, which suggests the possibility of a relationship that is at once both incestuous and nonincestuous. See Marc Shell, The End of Kinship (Stanford, Calif., forthcoming 1987), esp. conclusion. 34. Horn and Meer, "PT Survey," 58. Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Philadelphia, 1948) , report that between 40 and 50 percent of farm boys indicated that they had had sexual activity with animals.
35. "Who will know a generation hence that a snugglepup is a young man who attends petting parties, and that a petting party is a party devoted to hugging?"; George P. Krapp, The English Language in America (New York, 1925), 1:117.
36. I refer here to the photographs of scantily clad or nude women featured in Penthouse (circulation 3,500,000) and Playboy (circulation 4,250,000). Playboy's choice of the word rabbit to describe its women may be especially appropriate: an older word for "rabbit" is the English coney, from the Latin cuniculus. Edmund Leach, "The Animal Category and Verbal Abuse" (in Eric H. Lenneberg, ed., New Directions in the Study of Language [Cambridge, 1966] ), writes that "the eighteenth-century rabbit was a 67. This representation of Christianity and Judaism as particularist and universalist may be inaccurate in two ways at least. First, Christianity, however much it idealizes itself as universalist ("All men are my brothers"), becomes emphatically particularist in practice ("Only my brothers are men"). Indeed, the extremism of the claim to universalism would seem to ensure particularism in practice. Second, the connection between universalism and particularism in Judaism is more complex than the ordinary Christian view of Judaism would allow. On the one hand, Judaism certainly does enjoin several particularist legal doctrines. Thus one rule asks Jews to distinguish between brothers and others when making monetary loans: "Thou shalt not
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